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Abstract – Footnote four of US Supreme Court Justice Stone’s judgment in Carolene 
Products sets out a counter-majoritarian safeguard justification for judicial review of 
legislation. Jeremy Waldron’s so-called ‘core-case’ against judicial review of legislation 
is premised upon certain assumptions, without which Waldron himself concedes his 
arguments would not be sufficient. Waldron assumes that in liberal democracies most 
members of society and most of its officials are committed to the idea of individual and 
minority rights. He argues that it follows from this that the justification for judicial review 
set out in Carolene Products footnote four does not apply. This assumption 
underestimates the potential for future prejudice of discrete and insular minorities in 
liberal democratic states. Contra Waldron, I suggest that there is no contradiction in 
noting our capability of moral reasoning, which makes us worthy right-bearers, and our 
moral fallibility, which is the basis for judicial review of legislation.  Evidence suggests 
we should be pessimistic about whether we can reliably fulfil our moral capability. If 
legislatures may not perform their functions in accordance with right reason, we should 
utilise constitutional rights and judicial review of legislation as a safeguard to minimise 
error. 
 
“The one thing that does not abide by majority rule is a person’s 
conscience.”  
 – ‘Atticus Finch’ in Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird 
 
In footnote four of his judgment in Carolene Products Justice Stone stated 
that: “Prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special 
condition… which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial 
inquiry.”1 The footnote should be seen in the context of the constitutional 
crisis between the US Supreme Court and Congress in the wake of Franklin 
D. Roosevelt’s New Deal, the economic reforms that were enacted from 
1933 onwards in the wake of the Great Depression. At the time, a majority 
of the US Supreme Court’s nine judges had been appointed by Republican 
Party presidents. The Supreme Court doctrine at the time, following Lochner 
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v New York 2 , safeguarded business liberties against regulatory 
encroachment. The pre-1937 Court had held that New Deal legislation 
impinging upon these business liberties was not aided by the usual 
presumption of constitutionality and was presumptively unconstitutional. In 
1937-1938, the Court’s position began to change; this change was secured 
when Justice Black succeeded Justice Van Devanter and the Court's 
business-protecting bloc lost its majority. The Court was politically 
discredited by its defence of laissez-faire capitalism against the will of 
Congress and, as such, the institution of judicial review needed rejuvenation. 
 So it was appropriate that Carolene Products footnote four employed 
an idea of democracy, which included egalitarianism as well as participation, 
to serve as a foundation for constitutional rights and judicial review of 
legislation in the United States. The footnote states that there should be a 
higher level of judicial scrutiny of legislation, where it discriminates against 
minorities, particularly those who lack sufficient numbers or power to seek 
redress through the political process. So the footnote sets out an egalitarian, 
counter-majoritarian justification for judicial review of legislation. By 
safeguarding “discrete and insular minorities” from legislation prejudicial to 
them, the intention behind the wording of the footnote is to ensure that 
citizens are treated with equal concern and respect in democratic political 
decision-making.3 
 Disputing the relevance of this safeguard rationale, Jeremy Waldron 
has made a penetrating and influential case against judicial review of 
legislation. As a legal positivist, he has argued that he does not need to rely 
on his own metaethical views in building a case against judicial review of 
legislation. Yet, Waldron’s core-case against judicial review of legislation is 
premised upon certain assumptions, without which Waldron himself 
concedes his arguments would not be sufficient.  These assumptions include: 
(α) the commitment of most members of society and most of its officials to 
the idea of individual and minority rights; and, (β) persisting, substantial, 
and good faith disagreement about rights (i.e., about what the commitment to 
rights actually amounts to and what its implications are) among the members 
of the society who are committed to the idea of rights.4 
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Waldron assumes, reasonably, that most members and officials in 
liberal democratic societies are committed to the idea of individual and 
minority rights. Accordingly, he believes that the assertion made by Justice 
Stone in footnote four of his judgment in Carolene Products Company,5 that 
“prejudice against discrete and insular minorities” may justify judicial 
review of legislation, does not apply in such liberal democratic societies, 
because ‘discrete and insular minorities’ are not prejudiced where (α) most 
members and officials of a society are committed to the idea of individual 
and minority rights.  Waldron notes that “[the prejudice of discrete and 
insular minorities] ... is an excellent way of characterizing the sort of non-
core-case in which the argument for judicial review of legislative decisions 
has some plausibility.”6  But, in my view, it would be erroneous to assume 
that assumption (α), that most members and officials of a society are 
committed to the idea of individual and minority rights, will always be true 
of states which are ‘liberal democracies’. 
I argue that a community’s political institutions should be designed so 
that they are likely to make political decisions in accordance with right 
reason, rather than maximise the degree of participation, expressing popular 
opinion. That p is true is not determined by the number of people that 
believe that p. Waldron suggests we should use a popular majority decision 
procedure (MDP) as a ‘second-order’ decision procedure on pragmatic 
grounds to determine the most legitimate ‘first order’ decision procedure.7 I 
reject this idea because choosing MDP prejudices the second-order decision-
maker in favour of choosing MDP at the first-order, so it cannot be 
‘legitimacy-free’. Furthermore, contra Waldron, I suggest that there is no 
contradiction in noting our capability of moral reasoning, which makes us 
worthy right-bearers, and our moral fallibility, which is the basis for judicial 
review of legislation.  Evidence suggests we should be pessimistic about 
whether we can reliably fulfil our moral capability.  As such, if assumption 
(α) is true of liberal democratic states, that state of affairs is particular, 
conditional and transient. If popular MDP of legislatures may not perform 
their functions in accordance with right reason, we should utilise 
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constitutional rights and judicial review of legislation as a safeguard to 
minimise error. 
 
A. WALDRON’S ARGUMENT AGAINST JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION 
Waldron argues against constitutional rights and their interpretation in 
judicial review of legislation as follows: 
 
1. Liberal democratic societies are characterised by (β) – persisting, 
substantial and good faith disagreement.  This assertion differs from 
Rawls’s assertion that there exists a permanent, reasonable diversity 
of conflicting and irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines.  Whilst 
Rawls believed that an overlapping consensus could be achieved 
between these comprehensive doctrines on a conception of justice, 
rights and fairness in an ideal society with social stability, Waldron 
disagrees, believing reasonably that we live in a non-ideal society of 
modus vivendi. He contends that disagreement extends beyond 
conceptions of the good life, to our conceptions of justice, rights and 
fairness.8 
2. When there is disagreement in a society about a matter on which a 
common decision is needed, every member has the right to participate 
on equal terms in the resolution of that disagreement.9  This should be 
understood as a right to participate in all political decisions made 
governing their community, which means having an equal say in 
social decisions on issues of moral principle, and not just interstitial 
matters of socio-economic policy.10  Whilst the purpose of law is to 
enable us to act in the face of disagreement, insofar as every society 
needs collectively binding decisions, the creation of those laws must 
proceed by ‘democratic’ means alone.11 
3. By ceding power to the courts to review a decision enacted by a fairly 
elected legislature, constitutional rights undermine democratic 
institutions. The right of citizens to participate in political decisions is 
compromised when proposals are made to shift decisions about the 
conception and revision of fundamental rights from the legislature to 
the courtroom, from the people and their (admittedly imperfect) 
                                                
8 Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (OUP 1998) 158; John Rawls, Political 
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10 ibid, 13. 
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representative institutions to a handful of people, who are supposedly 
wise, learned, and virtuous, who alone should be trusted to adjudicate 
the significant issues that fundamental rights raise.12  As such, if 
constitutional rights exist, the courts become the forum for the 
revision of these rights, as society changes and new social 
controversies emerge,13 because when a provision is entrenched in a 
written constitution, the claim-right to liberty or provision that it lays 
down becomes immune to legislative change, in effect, disabling the 
legislature from its normal functions of revision, reform, and 
innovation in the law.14 
 
B. SEMANTICS, DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION 
Immediately, we are faced with a problem when considering the merits of 
Waldron’s claims about constitutional rights and judicial review of 
legislation with regard to the term ‘democracy’: there are competing 
meanings attributed to the term ‘democracy’ which reflect competing 
conceptions of democracy.  Waldron identifies democracy as the right of 
majorities to rule.  This has the advantages of simplicity and the frequent 
employment of popular majority-rule voting.  Another meaning, adopted by 
the late Ronald Dworkin amongst others, is more complex but, arguably, 
more plausible.  It insists that political systems be organised on the basis of 
an abstract principle of political morality: political equality, whereby citizens 
have an equal voice over governmental decisions.  It allows opportunities for 
majority-rule voting and direct popular participation to play important roles 
in working democracies, but it asserts that legitimate democracies are those 
that respect minority rights and promote fair and inclusive deliberation.  
Existing democratic systems have counter-majoritarian elements, 
including judicial review of legislation: this has implications for the meaning 
of ‘democracy’. For example, we do not hesitate to call the US or Germany, 
both of which have judicial review of legislation, democratic states. So to 
avoid confusion, I will adopt Dworkin’s meaning of democracy when using 
the term ‘democracy’, because I think Dworkin’s idea is closer to how 
people largely understand the term. I will use the term ‘popular 
majoritarianism’ to refer to what Waldron understands as democratic. 
In comparing the merits of a legislature’s popular MDP and judicial 
decision procedures, Waldron seems to assume that they are underpinned by 
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alternative, mutually exclusive accounts of political authority.  Yet, even for 
the purposes of strong judicial review, judicial authority is limited to the 
protection of constitutional rights. The judiciary does not even have 
authority to decide all matters related to constitutional rights that are 
allocated to the courts under judicial review. As Kavanagh has observed, 
much of the detailed regulation of rights is carried out by the legislature in 
the course of policy making decisions, not all of which will be in response to 
judicial decisions.15 The fact that judicial review is not a complete theory of 
political authority means that arguing for judicial review does not amount to 
a rejection of MDP.  Rather, in examining such an argument, we are merely 
considering the extent and scope of MDP: whether there is a case for 
restricting the scope of MDP concerning constitutional rights. 
No political system which prevents citizens from playing a part in the 
decision-making process can be democratic.  But MDP by the legislature is 
only one form of participation, there are others, including judicial review.16  
The exact kind or degree of participation that is desirable is subject to 
debate. As such, a popular MDP by a legislature is not axiomatic of 
democracy, given the value of participation.17 
That there is value in participation is undisputed: first, it confirms the 
individual’s equal membership or standing in the community.  Guaranteeing 
an equal right of participation evinces a “public recognition of equal respect 
for the autonomy of persons ... a communal acknowledgement of individual 
worth.”18 It provides affirmation that one is regarded by others as a person 
whose opinions and choices are of value. This increases citizens’ sense of 
affinity to their community. Second, it is important that people are able to 
express, assert and act upon their moral convictions and commitments in the 
public domain, because it enhances a person’s sense of worth if they can 
communicate their views to others and attempt to convince them of their 
correctness.19 Dworkin sees these participatory benefits as consequential,20 
                                                
15 Aileen Kavanagh, ‘Participation and Judicial Review: A Reply to Jeremy Waldron’  
(2003) 22.5 Law and Philosophy 451, 752-5. 
16 ibid. 
17 ibid. 
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Democracy (NYUP 1983) 74-5. 
19 Ronald Dworkin, ‘What Is Equality? Part 4: Political Equality’ (1987) 22 University of 
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20 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Harvard 
University Press 2000) 187. 
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whereas Waldron believes that, because these benefits are directly related to 
the right to participation, they are intrinsic benefits.21 
Does Waldron really think that there are no possible good effects that 
could count in favour of judicial review, or any other deviation from MDP?  
Would Waldron really insist that, if judicial review of legislation was the 
only means of preventing, say, ethnic cleansing, this fact would not count 
towards justifying judicial review?  If so, the argument would appear to be a 
reductio ad absurdum.22  He would respond that such an example would be 
outside his core-case that it does not conform to assumption (α).  But it is 
hard to see how a right can be conditionally intrinsic, of intrinsic value in 
one set of circumstances (core-cases) and of instrumental value in another 
set of circumstances (non-core-cases).  Regardless, I reject the truth of 
assumption (α) in the future in states that are, at present, what we would 
regard as liberal democracies. 
Following these objections, we can consider what Dworkin has in 
mind: the “instrumentalist condition of good government” 23 , that a 
community’s political institutions should be designed so that they are likely 
to make political decisions in accordance with right reason.  It is “the 
fundamental criterion for judging any procedure is the justice of its likely 
results ... the test of constitutional arrangements is always the overall balance 
of justice.” 24  Democratic government is subject to the instrumentalist 
condition because what is just, right or fair does not always correspond with 
what is voted for through popular MDP. 
Waldron privileges the right to participation over other rights. But if 
we disagree about rights, why is the right to participation immune from this? 
The right to participation is not uncontested. We could satisfy Waldron’s 
concerns about participation just as easily by drawing the straws as by using 
MDP.25 Drawing straws would give citizens an equal and direct influence 
over the outcome. But drawing straws is not a satisfactory solution: 
outcomes matter. 
People participate in politics to influence politics in favour of a 
morally good state of affairs, in an attempt to achieve their preferred 
                                                
21 Waldron (n 4) 1373. 
22 David Enoch, ‘Taking Disagreement Seriously’ (2006) 39.3 Israel Law Review 22, 26.  
23 Joseph Raz, Ethics in The public Domain (OUP, 1994) 117; Rawls, A Theory of Justice 
(Harvard University Press 1971) 232. 
24 Rawls (n 22) 230. 
25 David M Estlund, ‘Beyond Fairness and Deliberation: The Epistemic Dimension of 
Democratic Authority’ in Thomas Christiano (ed), Philosophy and Democracy (OUP 
2003), 81-83. 
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outcomes. Yet, popular preference does not transform a morally wrong state 
of affairs into a state of affairs that is morally right: that p is not true by the 
number people making the assertion that p. Where political decisions with 
moral content are made, such decisions can be assessed in light of the 
morality of the states of affairs they establish or actions they authorise. The 
fact that decisions are taken by a majority does not preclude, or at least 
should not preclude, such evaluation. There is an independent criterion for 
deciding which outcome of the decision-making procedure is just, but it is 
impossible to design a procedure that will always lead to the right result.  
Whether a decision is just or unjust is not itself determined by the properties 
of the procedure from which the decision results.26 
I would argue that the intrinsic value of the right of participation does 
not compromise the central importance of the “instrumentalist condition of 
good government”. 27  Waldron assumes that the MDP that elects the 
legislature is the only appropriate means of affecting the right of 
participation; yet judges are also selected from among the people, albeit not 
by a voting procedure. With the rise of the career politician, both groups of 
representatives are in some way selected from an elite pool. Kyritsis has 
argued that “the decisions of legislatures are made on behalf of the people 
and are meant to be binding on the people, but they are not made by the 
people in any but a metaphorical sense.”28  
Kyritsis distinguishes a ‘proxy’ account of legislators, where the 
legislator’s role is to express the views held by his constituency, from a 
‘trustee’ account where, though responsive to their constituents, legislators 
have the power to decide to some degree independently of their constituents’ 
convictions.  Kyritsis argues that the ‘trustee’ model more accurately reflects 
the practice of political representation.  If the ‘proxy’ model were the more 
accurate model, mechanisms like the imperative mandate or the revocability 
of the representative by his constituents would be much more popular than 
they actually are.  In fact, they are quite rare. All voters can do to express 
their dissatisfaction with a delegate is to vote him out of office in the next 
election. But this does not affect the institutional significance of the 
decisions he had voted for. On many issues citizens do not even have 
determinate views, which it would be the representative's job to implement 
at the institutional level: electors often vote for candidates on the basis of 
                                                
26 Kavanagh, (n 15) 458-63. 
27 Joseph Raz, Ethics in The public Domain (OUP 1994) 117; Rawls (n 22) 232. 
28 Dimitrios Kyritsis, ‘Representation and Waldron’s objection to judicial review’ (2006) 
26.4 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 733, 741. 
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their views on a limited number of political questions, but have no view on 
the rest of his agenda.  As such, “the putative attitude of disrespect cannot lie 
in the mere fact that judges make independent moral judgments in the name 
of the political community, even against the expressed views of (many) 
participating citizens, as is often claimed.”29 
 
C. WALDRON’S PRAGMATIC ARGUMENT FOR A SECOND-ORDER 
MAJORITY DECISION PROCEDURE 
People disagree about the value of majoritarian participation, just as they 
disagree about the value of having constitutional judicial review.  Waldron’s 
response is to say we can use MDP in a pragmatic way: 
“It is simply to use it ... if we choose one of the procedures which are 
up for decision as the procedure for making that very decision, we do 
so simply because we need a procedure on this occasion and this is the 
one we are stuck with for the time being.”30 
How can using a particular decision procedure in order to decide which 
decision procedure is most legitimate, avoid privileging that second-order 
procedure?  Nor is it clear how resorting to ‘pragmatics’ can sidestep the 
question of legitimacy.  Dworkin rebuts this response by appealing to our 
intuition: “It would not be any fairer for a majority of lifeboat passengers 
first to vote to hold an election and then to vote to throw the cabin boy out in 
that election than for them to vote to throw him out directly.”31  In other 
words, we can never justify a procedure if its outcome is substantively 
immoral.  So, in making this appeal to our intuition, Dworkin resorts to a 
restatement of the central importance of the ‘instrumentalist condition of 
good government.’ 
We can, however, go further than Dworkin, and attempt to further 
elaborate the concrete reasons why it is not possible to choose a second-
order decision on pragmatic grounds alone. If we use a procedure to 
determine which decision procedure to pursue without knowing whether or 
not it is legitimate, then we have no reason to accept the outcome of such a 
procedure as authoritative.  That one procedural arrangement should be used 
in preference to another prompts the question as to why that arrangement 
should have better claim for our support than any other. 
                                                
29 ibid 744. 
30 Waldron (n 8) 300; Cf. Jeremy Waldron, ‘A Majority in the Lifeboat’ (2010) 90.2 
Boston University Law Review 1043, 1043ff. 
31 Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Harvard University Press 2011) 387. 
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Waldron must provide reasons as to why his preferred procedure has a 
value that both outweighs outcome-based reasons and that does not collapse 
into such outcome-based reasons. As Kavanagh notes, “the proceduralist 
response that [popular MDP] is the mechanism ‘we are stuck with for the 
time being’ ... does not carry any moral weight: it gives no good reason to 
‘stick with it’ in the future.”32  Second-order decision procedures refer 
directly to the distinction between popular majoritarianism and popular 
sovereignty.33  Questions regarding the method in which decisions about 
constitutional essentials should be resolved (by majoritarian or legal 
institutions) are the same questions that Hobbes and Locke examined when 
contemplating a social contract.34  Both Hobbes and Locke believed in 
popular sovereignty, the right of decisions about constitutional regimes to be 
made by MDP; both gave reasons for this belief.   
In contrast, Waldron claims that this area is a ‘legitimacy-free zone’ 
and that all our decision procedures are equally acceptable because all can be 
chosen pragmatically. In my view, however, Waldron privileges popular 
majoritarianism, because to use popular majoritarianism as the means to 
resolve disagreements about constitutional basics is to give it precedence 
over other procedures at the second-order level, and this inevitably privileges 
the likelihood that it will be the preferred procedure at the first-order level. 
If pragmatic arguments fail for the reasons given above, Waldron 
needs to identify reasons to value popular majoritarianism and reasons to 
prefer it to other decision-making procedures. But, in doing so, Waldron 
cannot avoid appealing to the moral considerations pertaining to the value of 
popular majoritarianism in order to argue convincingly against other second-
order procedures.35 However, as Fabre has suggested, “by appealing to such 
moral considerations, Waldron would be vulnerable to the charge that he is 
in fact pre-empting the expressions by citizens of their conflicting views on 
those moral considerations themselves.”36 
Waldron does offer a reason for advocating popular majoritarianism.  
Referring to non-‘democratic’37 decision procedures: 
“They have in addition one legitimacy related defect that popular 
majoritarianism does not have: they do not allow a voice and a vote in 
                                                
32 Kavanagh (n 15) 469. 
33 Waldron (n 8) 254. 
34 ibid, 255-7. 
35 See Cecile Fabre, ‘A Philosophical Argument for a Bill of Rights’ (2000) 30 British 
Journal of Political Science 77, 78. 
36 ibid. 
37 Here I refer to ‘democratic’ following Waldron’s understanding of the term. 
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a final decision-procedure to every citizen of the society; instead they 
proceed to make final decisions about the right of millions on the 
basis of the votes of a few.”38 
If we are in a legitimacy-free zone, how can one method have greater 
legitimacy than another, as Waldron indicates here?  If second-order 
decision procedure is a purely pragmatic choice between popular 
majoritarianism and other methods, questions of legitimacy do not arise in 
this way because moral reasons cannot be given because there is no shared 
moral basis from which reasoning can proceed.  Hence, Waldron’s claim 
that we should use a second-order MDP would have no impact because it is 
the significance of such points that is the subject of disagreement. That 
Waldron makes such a claim suggests that moral rather than pragmatic 
considerations underpin Waldron’s preference for popular MDP for second-
order decisions. That this is not explicitly stated in Law and Disagreement 
suggests that Waldron is sensitive to the charge of prejudging the moral 
considerations of citizens, the avoidance of which is the starting point for his 
whole project. 
The suspicion is that, despite arguing to the contrary, Waldron’s view 
on judicial review of legislation is motivated by his metaethical views. 
Waldron is an emotivist.39 He believes that ethical judgments do not express 
propositions or beliefs that can be true or false.  Instead, they express 
sentiments or feelings about certain actions, which cannot be either true or 
false. As AJ Ayer put it: 
“if I say to someone, ‘You acted wrongly in stealing that money,’ I 
am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, ‘You stole that 
money.’ In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any 
further statement about it. I am simply evincing my moral disapproval 
of it. It is as if I had said, ‘You stole that money,’ in a peculiar tone of 
horror, or written it with the addition of some special exclamation 
marks . . . If now I generalise my previous statement and say, 
‘Stealing money is wrong,’ I produce a sentence which has no factual 
meaning – that is, expresses no proposition which can be either true or 
false.”40 
                                                
38 Waldron (n 8) 299. 
39 Waldron, ‘Moral Truth and Judicial Review’ American Journal of Jurisprudence, 43 
(1998); Waldron, ‘The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity’ in George (ed.) Natural Law 
Theory: Contemporary Essays (OUP Clarendon Press, 1992). 
40 AJ Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (Dover Publications, 1952) 107. 
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So Waldron believes that when a person says ‘That is wrong!’ they are 
merely making a noise to express their view, you may as well be saying 
‘Boo!’ It follows from this view that a MDP by legislators might be an 
appropriate way for a polity of citizens to express its feelings: where moral 
propositions are merely emotive and, thus, non-cognitivist, arguments about 
the process of deliberation on moral issues are less significant than the right 
to participate, to make one’s feelings heard, for that is all one can do. This 
assertion is undermined by Kyritsis’s aforementioned suggestion that 
legislators often do not express the views held by their constituents.41 
There are good grounds for rejecting emotivism as a metaethical 
theory. It seems possible to judge something as morally wrong without 
having any emotional reaction to it, or even feeling positive about it. For 
example, the ‘amoralist’ – a person who knows what’s right and wrong but 
doesn’t care – seems imaginable. Furthermore, if moral judgments are in fact 
just expressions of emotion, they can’t contradict each other, and we can’t 
reason about them, so why argue? Ayer argues that we stop engaging in 
moral disputes once all matters of empirical fact have been settled. But we 
do argue about the morality of an act. On Ayer’s account we cannot 
contradict one another when discussing moral issues because our statements 
are non-cognitive.  
The sort of disagreement that Waldron alludes to in his argument 
against constitutionally entrenched rights undermines his own metaethical 
position. Even if we can’t settle our disputes about moral judgments, we still 
contradict each other when, for example, we argue about the morality of 
abortion. So emotivism doesn’t seem to be able to account for the way we 
make moral judgments. Our practice of making moral judgments treats such 
judgments as propositional in a number of ways – we use them in logical 
arguments, inferring from them, we ‘embed’ them in other kinds of 
statements and use them in un-asserted context.42 So we have good grounds 
to be skeptical about a constitutional hypothesis that is motivated by 
emotivism. 
 
D. DISTINGUISHING MORAL CAPABILITY AND MORAL FALLIBILITY 
Waldron asserts that the case for judicial review relies on an unduly 
pessimistic and distrustful view about the capacity of the democratic 
political process to protect fundamental human rights.43  To Waldron’s mind, 
                                                
41 Kyritsis (n 28) 741. 
42 Peter Geach, ‘Assertion’ (1964) 74 Philosophical Review 449-465. 
43 Waldron (n 8) 221-3. 
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the claim that judicial review is necessary to protect individual and minority 
rights “is only plausible as long as one thinks that proper regard will not be 
paid to individual rights in the democratic and representative processes”;  i.e. 
where assumption (α) is false.44 In contrast, according to Waldron, we 
should assume that “voters and legislators are capable of focusing their 
deliberations on the general good and on some sense of the proper balance 
that should be held among individual interests in society”; i.e. where (α) is 
true.45 
According to Waldron, the arguments for judicial review are at odds 
with the basis on which we protect the rights that supporters of such a 
provision are seeking to protect: human beings are responsible moral agents 
with the capacity for autonomy.46  Waldron believes that that attribution of 
rights to humans is based on a Kantian view of human beings as right-
bearers being autonomous and having ability to reason morally and exercise 
their rights in a responsible and moral way. If we propose to design our 
institutions on the basis that people will act irresponsibly or irrationally, then 
we infer the paradoxical belief that people are not worthy of the rights we 
wish to protect: 
“This attitude of mistrust of one’s fellow citizens does not sit 
particularly well with the aura of respect for their autonomy and 
responsibility that is conveyed by the substance of the rights which 
are being entrenched in this way.”47 
However, if we adopt the trustee model of legislators, this critique would be 
a problem for the legislature as much as the courts upholding citizens’ rights. 
We should not doubt that human beings have a capacity to deliberate about 
rights or to strive for their protection.  Nor should we doubt that people are 
capable of voting in a moral way, or in a way that looks beyond their own 
narrow self-interest and incorporates consideration of the common good. 
However, that we accept human beings’ capacity to make the right decision 
when they act politically, does not equate to a belief that human beings will 
always do so.  Human beings may make the wrong decision, either because 
they give preference to their own self-interest over the common good, or 
because they fail to consider the long-term effects of their decision or its 
                                                
44 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Rights and Majorities: Rousseau Revisited’ in Liberal Rights (CUP 
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46 Waldron, ‘Rights-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights’ (1993) 13 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 18, 27. 
47 Waldron (n 8) 222. 
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possible effect on others.  As such, we may assert that human beings have 
the capacity to reason morally (a justification for humans’ rights-bearing 
status) and, sometimes, decide badly.  Capacity for moral judgment is not 
inconsistent with moral fallibility. It is not inconsistent to recognise that 
people often favour their own rights over rights of other people and also 
recognise them as responsible moral agents. If the evidence points to the 
conclusion that some people are morally incompetent, does morality in 
general or the duty to treat people with respect in particular require that we 
do not believe what our evidence supports?48 
History shows us the potential in human beings for moral fallibility of 
majorities: one need only look at certain acts of ethnic cleansing committed 
in the twentieth century, or the permissibility of slavery in the USA until the 
late nineteenth century49 for sufficient evidence. We have no reason to 
assume the thesis that the progress of history must lead toward the 
establishment of a ‘universal and homogenous’ liberal democratic state, is 
correct.50 It is equally clear that judicial review can strike out morally 
fallacious law, preventing morally abhorrent popular majoritarian policy 
from being implemented which prejudices ‘discrete and insular minorities’.  
Before Brown v Board of Education,51 it appears that many Americans 
believed that racially segregated schools, and the underlying rationale, racial 
discrimination, were morally permissible: now these are regarded as morally 
abhorrent, regardless of historical context. 
A Kantian moral theory and my pessimistic view of human moral 
fallibility are not inconsistent. As Sullivan observes: “Kant clearly did not 
wish to deny that people can and do make wrong moral judgements.”52  A 
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plausible reading of Kant’s respect for humanity is perfectly consistent with 
my observation.  Kant did not want to deny that it is possible for a person 
when making moral judgments, to make an ‘honest’ mistake, without 
necessarily being an evil person.  For example, he holds that errors in 
general may be due to “a crude and unpracticed” judgment.53  Kant thought 
that Epicurus, though mistaken in his belief, still merited the judgment of 
being “virtuous”.54  He admits, “I can indeed err at times in my objective 
judgment as to whether something is a duty or not”; and the principles a 
person of good character adopts “might occasionally be mistaken and 
imperfect”.55 
There is both a moral effort and epistemological incompetence behind 
Kant’s respect for humanity. We merit this respect because of who we are 
and what we can become. This is consistent with our epistemological 
incompetence and moral corruption; whether we should believe that we are 
depends on evidence rather than our moral capability.  The Kantian view, 
which I hold, is not compromised by this evidence. There is no contradiction 
in claiming that we human beings are worthy of Kantian respect because of 
our capacity to act morally, and that we should be distrusted because of what 
the evidence shows we are likely to do. This observation also holds for 
rights.  We have rights because of our moral capability, what we can become 
and this is consistent with us being morally fallacious, and thus with using 
constitutional measures to decrease the dangers rights-bearers are likely to 
bring about.56 
When we think about institutional design, we should consider the 
probability that political institutions will fulfil their functions in accordance 
with right reason and, if they do not fulfil those functions in this manner, 
whether a safeguard can be introduced to mitigate error.  Given that we think 
that the interests that rights protect are important, I believe that protecting 
against risk should be given greater weight than optimism concerning 
peoples’ moral convictions. Thus we should err on the side of vigilance 
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rather than complacency when it comes to designing institutions to uphold 
rights. 
 
E. WALDRON’S EXAMINATION OF CAROLENE PRODUCTS FOOTNOTE FOUR 
Waldron, pre-empting the argument I have made (that liberal democratic 
states will not permanently and unconditionally reflect assumption (α) which 
is necessary for his core-case to proceed), has tried to limit the applicability 
of Carolene Products footnote four provision.57  He recognises that “if taken 
seriously, ‘discrete’ and ‘insular’ are useful adjectives” because they convey 
not only the notion of a minority that exists apart from political decision 
making (a decisional minority) but also a minority that is isolated from the 
rest of the community, where they do not share many interests with non-
members that would enable them to form coalitions to promote their 
interests (a topical minority).58  The alignment of decisional and topical 
minorities exemplify ‘insularity’ in this sense and Waldron accepts that it is 
a cause for concern. 
Waldron recognises that “[p]ervasive prejudice is certainly 
incompatible with ... assumption [(α)]” because “it connotes indifference or 
hostility to the rights of the group’s members, and it may lead members of 
the majority to differ unreasonably from the minority members’ estimation 
of their own rights.”59 As I have argued, we cannot assume assumption (α) is 
permanent and unconditional in any state. 
In such cases, Waldron himself concedes that his core argument 
against judicial review cannot be sustained. But this is not equivalent to an 
argument in favour of judicial review.  For Waldron that argument depends 
on whether judicial majorities are infected with the same prejudice as 
legislative majorities. If they are, it follows that judicial review of legislation 
cannot protect minority rights if there is no support at all for them in society.  
Waldron characterises the response as assuming that respect for the relevant 
minority’s rights outside the minority’s own membership is largely confined 
to ‘political elites’. ‘Elite sympathisers’ may be legislators or judges, but 
elite sympathisers in the judiciary are better able than those in an elected 
legislature to protect themselves when they protect the rights of an 
unpopular minority because they need not worry about retaliation by an 
unsympathetic popular majority, because they are not elected (at least 
directly) by the popular majority and do not serve fixed terms.  So they are 
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more likely to protect the minority. Waldron asserts that if the assumption 
that sympathy for the minority’s rights is strongest among political elites is 
false, then the argument above falls down.60 In my view, the judiciary can be 
differentiated from voters and the legislature, not because they are more 
likely to express sympathy for minorities’ rights but because they have a 
professional obligation to be impartial and their decision procedure is limited 
to the interpretation of pre-determined constitutional rights. They are less 
likely to follow their own biases because of this constraint, a constraint that 
distinguishes them both from the voting citizen and the ‘trustee’ legislator. 
Waldron underestimates the significance placed upon the independence, 
neutrality and impartiality of judiciaries in liberal democratic states. 
Disagreement about what the Constitution means might lead towards 
deferential rulings that gives the legislature the benefit of the doubt, but a 
court must sometimes stand ready to enforce the Constitution in the face of 
disagreement. Reasonable disagreement ought not prevent a court from 
applying a superior constitutional law over an inferior piece of legislation, 
when they clearly conflict, to ensure citizens are treated with equal concern 
and respect by legislative provisions. 
 
F. CONCLUSION 
Political institutions should be designed so that they are likely to make 
political decisions in accordance with right reason. A given statement is not 
true by virtue of the number of people who believe it to be true. Thus, 
minorities should be protected from possible tyrannical majorities.  Waldron 
contends that fundamental rights are a reflection of human beings’ moral 
status and autonomy and that, accordingly, constitutionally entrenching them 
to protect ‘discrete and insular minorities’ suggests that human beings are 
not worthy of these rights we wish to protect. I riposte that human beings’ 
capability for moral reasoning does not necessarily infer that they are always 
morally responsible. This assertion is epistemological rather than moral: the 
evidence suggests we should be pessimistic about the likelihood that, even in 
liberal democratic states, most members of society and most of its officials 
will always be committed to the idea of individual and minority rights.  So 
Waldron is mistaken in assuming that Carolene Products footnote four 
provision 61  will never apply to states which are, at present, ‘liberal 
democracies’. It is plausible that judges will be infected by the same biases 
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as the rest of the population, but judges’ biases are less likely to be reflected 
in their decisions because of their professional obligation to be impartial and 
because they are constrained by their interpretation of constitutionally 
entrenched rights. Thus, following Kavanagh’s proposition that “the 
institutional design that is most likely to yield morally right decisions, or is 
likely to yield the most morally right decision, is most justified”,62 I believe 
that we should wager for judicial review of legislation. 
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